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Juridical Convergence in International Dispute Resolution
"La gente che per li sepolcri giace
potrebbesi veder? GiA son levati
tutt'i coperchi, e nessun guardia face."'
Canto X, The Inferno
Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy
"Cost com' io del suo raggio resplendo,
si, riguardando ne la luce etterna,
li tuoi pensieri onde cagioni apprendo." 2
Canto XI, Paradiso
Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy
I.

Introduction

The need for juridical convergence in public and private international law has
never been greater. Significant paradigm shifts concerning traditional notions of
sovereignty based upon national territory and geopolitical subdivisions, generally
referred to as "Westphalian," 3 have yielded to transnational, non-territorially premised, expansive views of this foundational norm. 4 The modem conception of
I DANTE ALIGHIERI, DIVINE COMEDY 132-33 (John D. Sinclair, trans., rev. ed. 1961) (1472) (Canto
X, The Inferno: "The people that lie within the sepulchres, may they be seen, for indeed all the covers are
raised and no one keeps guard?").
2 Id. at 162-3 (Canto XI, Paradiso: "Even as I reflect its beams, so, gazing into the Eternal Light, I
perceive thy thoughts and the cause of them.").
3 Westphalian sovereignty refers to the Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the
King of France and their respective allies, October 24, 1648 (the "Treaty of Westphalia"). While the
Treaty of Westphalia indeed brought an end to the Thirty-Year War, its most enduring legacy has been
the treaty's general discussion on the nature of sovereignty, which provided the foundations for a territo-

rially based conception that accorded a virtual monopoly in international law to sovereign States. The
writings of Grotius and Leibniz together with the treaty's text provided a framework for a rigid and
dogmatic conception of sovereignty that prevailed through the 20th century and is still accepted in some
quarters today. See, e.g., J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCrION T1-OINTERNATIONAL LAw 7-14 (9th ed. 1984). It is
this very static understanding of sovereignty as the absolute exercise of political will over a geopolitical
subdivision that in turn is defined by territorial boundaries that Black's Law Dictionary defines as

follows:
Sovereignty: the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is
governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will; paramount control of a constitution and
frame of government; and its administration; the self-sufficient source of political power, from
which all specific political powers are derived; the international independence of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation; also a
political society or state, which is sovereign and independent.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 2009). Classical international law would thus concern the
relationship between such "sovereign" states, always conducted with an understanding that such relationships could not impinge on the exercise of a political will within "sovereign" territorial boundaries.
4

For a balanced and illustrative narrative of the shift from classical dogmatic territorial sovereignty,

to a more flexible and less absolutist theory, see Alfred van Staden & Hans Vollaard, The Erosion of
State Sovereignty: Towards a Post-TerritorialWorld?, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL.
GOVERNANCE (Gerard Kreijen ed., 7th ed. 2002). See also Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning
Staff, U.S. Department of State., Remarks at the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for

International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC: Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving
Responsibilities (Jan. 14, 2003) (transcript available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/
16648.htm) (emphasizing that Westphalian sovereignty, defined as the absolute right of the sovereign and
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sovereignty radically adjusts for the absolutist elements of its dogmatic predecessor in large measure by no longer viewing the territorial boundaries of States as
coinciding with the limits of political authority over the economy and society.5
A broader doctrinal conception of sovereignty compels international law to
engage in a revision of its most rudimentary principles. Here the suggestion is
that international law, as the jurisprudence governing the relationship between
nations-itself based on a paradigm of independence-requiresa juridical convergence transcending national boundaries that would represent a model of interdependence6 rather than one of independence. Classical views of international
law that find conceptual and analytical support in traditional Westphalian sovereignty are only concerned with the relationship between and among countries.
They are proving to be incapable of addressing global problems pertaining to
humanity, which far transcend the relationships between nations. 7
The inability of international law to address the many shared crises of all citizens, such as: international terrorism, transnational security needs, global poverty, environmental threats that place in jeopardy the very survival of mankind
and that likely shall lead to the displacement of millions of people, regional genocide, political corruption, unworkable judiciaries, sexual exploitation, the vertical
and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and similar armaments of mass
destruction, and unprecedented food and water shortages-in short, human
rights-brings the frailties and shortcomings of international law readily apparent. These common problems provide a normative foundation calling for a global
law that addresses the needs of humanity that is configured as transnationaland
analyzed on resting on four fundamental precepts, was never absolute). Mr. Haass explained therefore,
the shift in models of sovereignty are all the more likely and credible:
Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four main characteristics: First, a sovereign
state is one that enjoys supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force
within its territory. Second, it is capable of regulating movements across its borders. Third, it can
make its foreign policy choices freely. Finally, other governments recognize it as an independent
entity entitled to freedom from external intervention. These components of sovereignty were
never absolute, but together they offered a predictable foundation for world order. What is significant today is that each of these components - internal authority, border control, policy autonomy, and non-intervention - is being challenged in unprecedented ways.
Id. For related authority on this issue, see also JOHN AGNEw, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY (2009);
STEPHEN D.

KRASNER,

SOVERIiNTY ORGANIZED HYPoCRISY (1999); JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY

(Julian H. Franklin trans., 2007) (parenthetical).
5 The late Professor Louis Henkin aptly noted that "[f]or legal purposes at least, we might do well to
relegate the term sovereignty to the shelf of history as a relic from an earlier era." Louis HtENKIN,
INTERNATIONA. LAW: POLriCS AND VALUES 10 (1995). Indeed, Professor Henkin opined that it would
be best to get rid of "that 'S' word." See, e.g., Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty and, Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REiv. 1 (1999).
6 The pre-eminence that the WTO, the WHO, the ILO, the World Bank, and the IMF acquired is
indicative of non-nationally based institutions that have increasing relevance in the national affairs of
state. Their development into NGOs and their ascendency exemplify the need to have institutions of
relevant consequences beyond the Westphalian paradigm. In this same vein, the United Nation's standing
as a "neutral forum" for the community of nations has never been more present. Therefore, so too has the
exigency "to democratize" it become an imperative to its continued legitimacy.
7

See, e.g.,

RAFAEL DoMINGo,

THE NEw GLOBAL LAW 65, 73 (Mortimer N. S. Sellers et. al. eds.,

2010).
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8 In addition to changes attendant to the doctrine of sovernot inter-national.
eignty, the need for juridical convergence has been underscored by economic and
informational globalization.
The advent of unprecedented porous economic frameworks, product and service outsourcing, and a global economic standard of financial multilateralism has
spawned a legal counterpart to economic globalization that is particularly evident
in international trade law. 9 The jurisprudence of international dispute resolution
and international investment protection, however, have hardly fared as well in
developing a multicultural rubric. It is in this context that international commercial arbitration ("ICA") and to a lesser extent, investor-state arbitration ("ISA"),
have emerged as temporizing measures perhaps unbeknownst to the vast constituency in the world of commerce, law, and academia.' 0 ICA and ISA are serving
as a bridge until a time comes when transnational courts of civil procedure vested
with the authority to adjudicate private disputes arising from cross-border controversies are able to exercise jurisdiction over such conflicts. International arbitration, whether in the context of private international law or in the public
international law investor-state matrix, shall serve as a Petri dish for the developing an ideal proportionality of different legal systems, which may ultimately create a confluence of legal cultures capable of satisfying the expectations of parties
to transnational proceedings. It is to this new space, far beyond the ambit of a
state's exercise of judicial sovereignty, that international dispute resolution must
look to find its perfect workings.
Juridical convergence in international dispute resolution has perhaps met its
most significant challenge in its efforts to reconcile civil law evidence gathering
with U.S. common law discovery. The chasm dividing civil and common law
traditions with respect to evidence gathering appears to be insurmountable and to
some extent has proven that it may not be bridged. The most recent iteration of
the International Bar Association Rules On The Taking Of Evidence in International Arbitration (the "IBA Rules") is emblematic of a significant effort to synthesize fundamental common and civil law concerns." The differences
8 For two divergent analyses as to normative underpinnings while calling for a transnational law

rubric that may best address cross-border challenges that belong to humanity and to no single nation but
rather a community of nations, compare Run G. TEiYTEL, HUMANrrY's LAW (2011), with DOMINGO,

supra note 7. As to Professor Domingo's work, see Pedro Martinez-Fraga, Rafael Domingo's The New
Global Law, 56 McGiu. L.J. 767 (2011) (book review).
9 See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, SovERIAGIrY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).

10 See, e.g., Hans Smit, The Futureof InternationalCommercial Arbitration:A Single Transnational
Institution? 25 CotUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9 (1986-87). Professor Smit notes that the increase in interna-

tional commercial arbitrations has also caused the proliferation of new arbitral institutions, and adds:
The case for a new world-wide arbitration institution is overwhelming. On every count, its advantages far exceed those that can be offered by existing institutions. One might argue against a
global institution on the ground that a similar case could be made for a world-wide judicial body,
but that that body has found only very limited acceptance.
Id. at 34. Professor Smit cites as authority for his latter observation the "light caseload" of the International Court of Justice, noting that it provides "a telling demonstration of the limited measure of acceptance that body has found." Id. at n.135.
11 On May 29, 2010, the IBA published a new edition of its Rules that aspires "to provide an efficient, economical and fair process for the taking of evidence in international arbitrations, particularly
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separating these traditions compel the identification and development of legal
norms, such as the IBA rules, capable of vesting efforts with greater substantive
foundational grounding if they are to continue developing and satisfy competing
expectations arising from disparate legal systems.12
This article aspires to constitute a modest half step towards the identification
and development of international norms that are necessary if convergence in evidence gathering is to be taken seriously as an objective of international dispute
resolution. It shall be asserted that a "privative transparency norm" would help to
develop substantive definitions of key terms that are central to evidence gathering such as those found in the IBA Rules that cry for doctrinal development.13
Accordingly, the first section of this article focuses on making the case for why
transparency (later to be termed "privative transparency norm") is an appropriate
norm that conceptually galvanizes convergence in cross-border evidence taking.
As part of that undertaking, this section concentrates on articulating the privacy/
confidentiality cloud that has historically shrouded ICA and, to a lesser extent,
ISA proceedings.' 4 The second section examines the different applications and
meanings that have been ascribed to transparency in international law documents,
treaties, and select arbitral awards in order to limit the parameters of a future
transparency norm and arrive at a single working understanding of the concept to
be applied to evidence gathering. The third section identifies a "principle of uncertainty" endemic to the architecture and fundamental features of ICA and ISA.
A fourth and final section of this writing applies a working transparency norm to
foundational evidence gathering terms that form of part of the IBA Rules.

those between partiesfrom different legal traditions." IBA RuLE.s ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L

ARBITRATION, pmbl. 1 (2010) (emphasis added) [hereinafter IBA 2010 RuitES]. These new Rules benefit from twenty-seven years of experience arising from the practice and commentaries concerning the
IBA Supplementary Rules Governing the Presentation and Reception of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration (May 28, 1983), and the IBA Rules On The Taking of Evidence in International
Arbitration (June 1, 1999). See Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, Good Faith,Bad Faith, But not Losing Faith:A
Commentary on the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in InternationalArbitration, 43 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 387, 389 (2012).

12 For present purposes, emphasis is placed on civil and common law legal traditions. If international
dispute resolution is to be truly international, legal systems from the East and Middle East must be
considered as part of the fashioning of transnational rules on evidence gathering.
13 In an earlier writing, Good Faith, Bad Faith, But Not Losing Faith: A Commentary on the 2010
IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in InternationalArbitration, I commented extensively on the IBA
Rules and in so doing identified central terms on which the Rules' rubric places considerable weight.
Martina-Fraga, supra note I1, at 389. That contribution, however, merely suggested that transparency as
a substantive norm was necessary, but did not elaborate on the suggestion as being outside the scope of
its subject matter. See id. at 426-30.
14 It shall be asserted that a "privacy vestige" is eminently detectable in ISA as part of the structural
legacy that international commercial arbitration bequeathed to it.
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II. Making a Case for Transparency as a Governing Norm in CrossBorder Evidence Gathering
A. The Privacy-Confidentiality Cloud Cloaking International Commercial
Arbitration
ICA has developed in a culture of privacy that is often misapprehended for
absolute confidentiality and that has suffered in its acceptance based on the
mercurial appetite and expectations of its consumers. The private nature of ICA
arises from its distinct and unique space within private international law. In contrast with its judicial counterpart, ICA is wholly removed from judicial proceedings because it is not a manifestation of an exercise of sovereignty in furtherance
of the purported equitable administration of justice. Private commercial dispute
resolution, as a creature of contract, is exercised beyond the realm of the state's
adjudicative framework and therefore forecloses any actual or perceived public
entitlement to access or disclosure.' 5 Indeed, it was this very administration of
justice parallel to the state's exercise of sovereignty, as an alternative to the
state's judicial system, that first spawned in both England and in the United
States the judicial antagonism against arbitration that pervaded and delayed its
development as a system of adjudication considered to be in pari materia with
legal proceedings.16
The privacy and attendant perception of confidentiality that attached to ICA
remains a compelling feature for its evolving consumer base.' 7 Despite the absence of authority for the proposition that confidentiality, as opposed to privacy, 1 constitutes a salient feature of ICA, the principle "is seen as implicit or a
corollary to an agreement to resolve a dispute by way of arbitration."l 9
Private international arbitration institutions were created with private disputes
in mind. These institutions deliberately enshrined lack of transparency or privacy,
15 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) ("arbitration is a creature
of contract").
16 See PEDRO J. MARTINPz-FRAGA, THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARIrrRATION: DocTRINAL DEVELOiMENTS AND DISCOVERY METHODs, 3 N.Y. Dispurn RESOLUTION LAW-

YR 1-5 (2009) (discussing how historical aversion to arbitration in America eventually yielded to in pari

materia litigation).
17 In a 2010 survey of in-house counsel that the School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary
University in London conducted, 84% of the persons surveyed expressed having elected arbitration, at
minimum in part, "because of its 'confidentiality."' Rdmy Gerbay, Deputy Registrar, London Court of
International Arbitration, Oral Presentation Given at the University of Warsaw: Confidentiality vs. Transparency in International Arbitration: The English Perspective, (Feb. 9, 2011), in 9 TRANSNAT'L Disp.

MGMT. 1 (2012). In these thoughtful remarks the author explains how "if arbitration is by definition
private, it is not necessarily confidential." Id.
18 The privacy-confidentiality dichotomy in international dispute resolution finds its apogee in the
developing practice and "jurisprudence" of investor-state arbitration by dint of the introduction of genuine public standing compelling challenges to basic privacy assumptions that were only legacy driven.
19 See, e.g., Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentialityand NAFTA Chapter 1I Arbitrations,2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
213 (2001). It is not within the scope of this writing to address the confidentiality/privacy dichotomy in
international commercial arbitration. On this point, suffice it to observe that generally any confidentiality
is subordinated to the principle of party-autonomy, such that by agreement of the parties confidentiality
under certain circumstances would never attach.
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which in turn generated a "democratic deficit." 2 0 Even commentators who opine
that ICA has achieved great gains with respect to transparency concede, without
qualification, that "international commercial arbitration is not a wholly, or even
mostly, transparent system." 2 1 They add that "[r]esearchers continuously lament
about the difficulties in assembling information as a result of continued secrecy
in international arbitration, and there remain concerns that insiders continue to
enjoy unfair advantages because of the lack of transparency." 22 The most recent
iteration of the principal arbitral rules suggests that there is no requirement for
institutional publication of any information whatsoever concerning the conduct
of an arbitral proceeding absent an agreement by the parties to the contrary. 2 3
Maupin observes "[t]hat not only the outcome but the very existence of an investor-state dispute may never be disclosed. Further, the confidentiality provisions
of these rules prohibit tribunals from ordering the disclosure of the disputing
parties' pleadings and evidence without the parties' consent." 2 4 The very institutional rules that procedurally structure ICAs and administer the proceedings
themselves underscore the privacy-confidentiality dichotomy together with the
attendant "democratic deficit." The more emblematic pronouncements certainly
compel review.
B. The Privacy-Confidentiality Dichotomy that Arbitral Institutions Nurture:
A "Conceptual Deficit"
As a general matter and in stark contrast with judicial proceedings, most arbitral institutions state outwardly that hearings are private, subject to agreement by
the parties or as otherwise provided by applicable mandatory law. 2 5 The pre20 Daniel Barstow McGraw Jr. & Niranjali Manel Amerasinghe, Transparencyand Public Participation in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 337, 342 (2009)
Indeed, one of the major draws of arbitration in the commercial field was (and still is) the lack of
transparency due to the ability of the parties to decide most aspects of the process. Partly because
these disputes were perceived as being purely private, public interest did not play a key role in
setting procedures in these institutions. Nevertheless, given the permeation of public disputes
into a typically private forum, there is a need for identifying democracy deficits within the system, whether on a private institutional level or an international level.
Id.
21 Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
1301, 1325 (2006).
22 See id. at 1325-26.
23 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RULES OF ARBITRATION (2012) [hereinafter
ICC Rules]; STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBrfRATION RULES (2010) [hereinafter SCC Rules];
THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE REsoLUTION ARBITRATION RULES (2010) [hereinafter ICDR
Rules]; THE LONDON COURT OF INTFRNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (1998) [hereinafter LCIA Rules].
As previously noted, the principle of party autonomy is accorded greater weight than principles of privacy or confidentiality. Julie A. Maupin, Transparency in InternationalInvestment Law: The Good, The
Bad, and The Murky, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14, n.81 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne
Peters eds., forthcoming 2013).
24 Maupin, supra note 23, at 15 (citing SCC Rules, art. 46).
25 See ICDR Rules, supra note 23, art. 4 (providing that "[h]earings are private unless the parties
agree otherwise or, the law provides to the contrary."). Also providing that "[t]he tribunal may require
any witness or witnesses to retire during the testimony of other witnesses" and "[tihe tribunal may
determine the manner in which witnesses are examined." Id. The 2012 iteration of the ICC Rules is
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sumption of privacy that attaches to ICA proceedings need not be stated in the
various institutional rules because the very nature of the proceeding itself is private. Therefore, any statement concerning the private character of the process
would be little more than aesthetic emphasis. 2 6
None of the rules of the major arbitral institutions define "privacy" or "confidentiality." It is conceptually problematic that the two terms often appear to be
used interchangeably. 27 Confidentiality, however, is accorded greater deference
and is mostly addressed in the context of what may be confidential pursuant to
applicable substantive law. 2 8 The paucity of any effort by these institutions to
distinguish between privacy and confidentiality is disconcerting and further accentuates the culture of the ill-defined privacy-confidentiality status permeating
ICA. The want of any attempt to define the terms beyond merely referring to
confidentiality as a term of art to be given substance by applicable substantive
law is equally unavailing. Thus, in addition to a democratic deficit, a normative
conceptual deficit also appears to attach.

C.

The Award and "Black-Box" Deliberations

The opaque culture defining the framework of ICA is also engrafted onto (i)
the finding of facts and conclusions of law to be expected of any reasoned adjudication, (ii) the very publication of the award, and (iii) the deliberation process.
The principal arbitral institutions shy away from classifying awards either as private or confidential. Instead, they emphasize non-disclosure or non-communication to third parties of material private terms. 29 All "decisions"-a term nowhere
silent on privacy but cognizant as to confidentiality. ICC Rules, supra note 23, art. 22(3). This article
provides:
Upon the request of any party, the arbitral tribunal may make orders concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings or of any other matters in connection with the arbitration and
may take measures for protecting trade secrets and confidential information.
Id. Here party-autonomy is accorded greater weight than a general presumption of confidentiality or
even of privacy.
26 LCIA Rules, supra note 23, art. 19.4. This article, for example, flatly states that the hearings are
private "unless the parties agree otherwise in writing or the arbitral tribunal directs otherwise." Id. (emphasis added).
27 For a careful analysis of the two concepts in international arbitration, see e.g., Michael Collins,
Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 121 (1995).
28 ICDR Rules, supra note 23, art. 20(6). This article provides:
The tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence
offered by any party. The tribunal shall take into account applicable principles of legal privilege,
such as those involving confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and a client.
Id. With no additional reference to the meaning of confidentiality other than to the use of the term, Art.
34 of the ICDR Rules explicitly addresses control and disclosure of confidential information:
Confidential information disclosed during the proceedings by the parties or by witnesses shall
not be divulged by an arbitrator or by the administrator. Except as provided in Art. 27, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, or required by applicable law, the members of the tribunal and
the administrator shall keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration or the award.
ICDR Rules, supra note 23, art. 34.
29 This non-disclosure is subordinated to party-autonomy (i.e., the agreement of the parties). See
ICDR Rules, supra note 23, art. 27(2), stating "[tihe tribunal shall state the reasons upon which the
award is based unless the parties have agreed that no reasons need be given." Id. (emphasis added). See
ICDR Rules, supra note 23, art. 27(4) (providing that "[a]n award may be made public only with the
consent of all parties or as required by law."). Later still, the ICDR Rules, supra note 23, art. 27(6)
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explained or defined by the arbitral rules-share the same fate as awards. 30
Treated neither as confidential nor private, they simply are not to be disclosed
without the consent of the parties. 3'
Providing "reasons" upon which an award is premised is poles apart from the
issuance of a reasoned and thorough award that frames issues, provides a comprehensive factual narrative of material facts, enunciates applicable law, and sets
forth the application of law to fact. A mere regurgitation of reasons in support of
a finding renders arbitral awards synoptic and therefore likely to disappoint party
expectations. Neither the LCIA nor the ICDR require a provision of "reasons"
underlying consent awards. 32
Privacy and confidentiality find their most robust pronouncement in ICA in
the ambit of the arbitral tribunal's deliberations. The cultures of ICA and ISA
accord considerable weight to a virtually unwritten doctrine of absolute deliberation confidentiality. The workings of deliberation confidentiality in international
arbitration comports with the architecture of a dispute resolution methodology
that emphasizes enforceability over accountability, or second-instance review.

requires that the filing or registration of the award also is to be kept private or confidential (it is unclear)
depending on governing law "if the arbitration law of the country where the award is made requires the
award to be filed or registered, the tribunal shall comply with such requirement." The ICDR Rules
address the partial publication of awards in Art. 27(8):
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the administrator may publish or otherwise make publicly
available selected awards, decisions and rulings that have been edited to conceal the names of
the parties or other identifying details or that have been made publicly available in the course of
enforcement or otherwise.
ICDR Rules, supra note 23, art. 27(8) (emphasis added). See ICC Rules, supra note 23, art. 34(2) (prescribing under the section entitled Notification, Deposit and Enforceability of the Award, that
"[a]dditional copies certified true by the Secretary General shall be made available on request and at any
time to the parties, but to no one else.")(emphasis added). See also LCIA Rules, supra note 23, art. 26.1
that in part provides "[t]he Arbitral Tribunal shall make its award in writing and, unless all parties agree
in writing otherwise, shall state the reasons upon which its award is based."
30 The term "decision" is commonly referred to in most arbitral institutional rules, but is never defined or even contextualized. See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 23, art. 6(6), 29(2), 35, 37.
31 See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 23, art. 11(4) ("The decisions of the Court as to the appointment,
confirmation, challenges; or replacement of such an arbitrator shall be final, and the reasons for such
decisions shall not be communicated.") (emphasis added). More expansive than its ICC Rules counterpart, LCIA Rules, supra note 23, art. 29.1 reads:
The Decisions of the LCIA courts with respect to all matters relating to the arbitration shall be
conclusive and binding upon the parties and the Arbitral Tribunal. Such decisions are to be
treated as administrative in nature and the LCIA court shall not be required to give any reasons.
Id.
32 See LCIA Rules, supra note 23, art. 26.8. This article states:

In the event of a settlement of the parties' dispute the Arbitral Tribunal may render an award
according to the settlement if the parties so request in writing (a "consent award"), provided
always that such award contains an express statement that it is an award made by the parties'
consent. A consent award need not contain reasons. . ..
Id. (emphasis added). Orders for costs also need not set forth underlying premises. See LCIA Rules,
supra note 23, art. 28. See also ICDR Rules, supra note 23, art. 29(1) ("If the parties settle the dispute
before an award is made, the tribunal shall terminate the arbitration, and, if requested by all parties, may
record the settlement in the form of an award on agreed terms. The tribunal is not obliged to give reasons
for such an award.") (emphasis added).
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While considerable ink has been spilled regarding the confidentiality of tribunal
deliberations, 3 3 scant actual normative juridical authority exists on the subject. 34
In this sense arbitral decision-making remains an impenetrable "black box"
process. Despite ably chronicled significant gains for transparency,3 5 deliberations remain obscured by design and practice in order to minimize the scope of
judicial intervention at the enforcement stage. Much-vaunted market forces, including competition among arbitral institutions, a more vibrant competitive environment with respect to arbitrators, greater awareness among consumers of
arbitral rules and services, and an increase in the proliferation of voluntarily published arbitral awards 36 have not led to a restructuring of arbitral institutional
frameworks so as to provide, by design or in praxis, greater transparency addressing the democratic deficit. To the extent that a discernable trend in disclosure can be documented, such descriptive-empirical analysis does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that transparency is being incorporated into the procedural
rubric and juridical culture of ICA conceptually or, more particularly, as a norm
of international law. The commentary that has been generated regarding the extent to which ICA suffers from want of transparency despite its formal private
nature, has led to conclusions that may be supported by a phenomenology but
that do not explain underlying principles responsible for the empirical data in the
first instance.
Rather than concluding that ICA is reinventing itself based upon the systematic incorporation of principles that are conducive to greater transparency for
present purposes of developing a privative transparency norm applicable to crossborder evidence gathering, this author asserts that the phenomenon is susceptible
to a causal explanation that finds conceptual foundation in the very precepts that
underlie ICA, and not in invisible market forces. Greater transparency in ICA has
been achieved because the principle of party-autonomy has garnered greater
structural and normative standing. This adjustment in the prominence of partyautonomy largely and most notably explains the proliferation of the publication
33 ILEANA B. SMEUREANU, CONFIDENTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2011);
see, e.g., Alan Redfern, Dissenting Opinions in InternationalArbitration: The Good, The Bad, and The
Ugly, 20 ARB. INT)L 223 (2004).
34 The LCIA is one of the few arbitral institutions that directly addresses the issue of confidentiality
in the deliberations of the arbitral tribunal instead of relying on amorphous but sacrosanct principles of
international commercial arbitration. Article 30.2 states:
The deliberations of the Arbitral Tribunal are likewise confidential to its members, save and to
the extent that disclosure of an arbitrator's refusal to participate in the arbitration is required of
the other members of the Arbitral Tribunal under Articles 10, 12, and 26.
LCIA Rules, supra note 23, art. 30.
35 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 21, at 1314-19 (arguing that multiple forces, including material increases in trade and trade-related disputes, have galvanized and improved the international commercial
arbitration system, thus making possible meaningful advances towards transparency).
36 Id. at 1319, n.73 (citing Dora Marta Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International
Arbitration: The Need for Proceduraland Structural Reform, 41 CotuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 923, 959
(2003) ("Today, several arbitral institutions, as well as independent publishers, have started to regularly
publish arbitral awards."). But see Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1335, 1340 (2003) ("Although certain sources for arbitral decisions exist... they are but the tip of the
iceberg of all the cases produced... and ... the ICC awards are an explicitly biased sample as the ICC
seeks to publish particularly interesting or unusual awards.").
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of sanitized arbitral awards, greater disclosure of the grounds for arbitral challenges, and increased access to the reasons underlying arbitral decision-making
generally.
While structural modifications to the rules certainly may be gleaned, they fall
materially short from rising to the level of representing transformative modifications. ICA is private because of its very foundation-a private contractual agreement within the framework of private international law applying the substantive
law of one jurisdiction and relating only to a microeconomic event that forecloses
public access or standing.3 7 Even though the length of arbitral awards in this field
has increased materially, 38 a jurisprudence of such awards in private international
law limited to persuasive authority has not developed, as is the case with ISAs.
Rarely do ICA awards contain citation to other awards as authority or persuasive
analytical grounding.
ICA can only shed its culture of privacy and confidentiality upon penalty of
denaturalizing and transforming itself into an international dispute resolution
methodology that as of yet does not exist and for which consumer demand cannot
be meaningfully identified. 39 A transparency norm can find resonance in ICA and
in ISA but only if it is developed as a substantive norm of private and public
international law, and its application is limited to discrete aspects of international
dispute resolution, such as in evidence gathering. This selective application of a
recognized norm can be substantively harmonized and reconciled with the structural private characteristics of international dispute resolution without denaturalizing it or otherwise engaging in the hyperbolization of minor rule amendments
that are conducive to greater public access or disclosure as somehow
transformative.
D. Investor-State Arbitration Inherited a Culture of Privacy from
International Commercial Arbitration
Even though the system of ICA primarily adjudicates disputes between private
individuals based upon private legal causes of action within a framework that is
severed from any geopolitical rubric and generally administered by a private in37 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 21, at 1308-09 (stating "At present, even cosmopolitan international
legal theorists would have difficulty effectively arguing that the world's citizens are interested parties in
all of its proceedings."). "Not surprisingly, therefore, ardent advocates of compulsory transparency reforms have conceded that transparency should not be insisted on in all cases because the public does not
have an interest in all cases." Id.
38 See generally YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Volume XXXVI 2011 (Albert. J. Van Den

Berg ed., 2011) (and previous editions from 1992-2010) (displaying the growth in the average length of
ICC arbitration awards). The average length of the awards published between 1992 and 2001 was 5,892
words. This nearly doubled to 10,881 words in the following decade (2002-2011). Id. It should be
emphasized that this finding is limited by the selective publication of awards by the editors of the YEAR1300K COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, in addition to the fact that some of the published awards are summarized. Id. Nevertheless, assuming other factors remained static, it is notable that the length of the
published awards grew materially during that two-decade timeframe. Id.
39 McGraw & Amerasinghe, supra note 20, at 342 ("Indeed, one of the major draws of arbitration in
the commercial field was (and still is) the lack of transparency due to the ability of the parties to decide
most aspects of the process.").
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stitution, it has engrafted its model on ISA.4 0 The standing configuration of the
parties in ISA involves a private entity asserting claims against a sovereign.
These treaty-based causes of action eminently fall within the domain of public
international law. 4 1 Claims arise from bilateral or multilateral investment treaties
and normally concern the interests of an investor-state and a host state. Consequently, the subject matter of the dispute is paradigmatically public in nature,
despite the prosecution of claims by a private party. 42 ISA necessarily transcends
the mere allocation of resources between private parties because, in part, it often
entails challenging a sovereign's exercise of sovereignty through the imposition
of regulatory imperatives. Moreover, as it is common for ISAs to focus on specific economic industry sectors, these proceedings give rise both to micro and
macroeconomic issues. 43
The international public policy addressing the protection accorded to investors
among capital-exporting countries (industrialized states) and capital-importing
countries (developing states) is directly formed and transformed by investor-state
arbitral proceedings. ICA generally does not affect public economic or political
policies."4 ISA has spawned a culture of award writing and publication. Because
40 Statement by the OECD Investment Committee, Transparency and Third Party Participation in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures, June 2005, available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/
investmentpolicy/34786913.pdf. (explaining "[t]he system of investment dispute settlement has borrowed
its main elements from the system of commercial arbitration").
41 Even though the claims asserted are treaty-specific, ISAs generally concern claims arising out of
alleged violations of (i) fair and equitable treatment, (ii) expropriation bereft of public purpose for which
there was no prompt and adequate compensation, (iii) treatment insufficient to meet international minimum standards, (iv) actions undermining national treatment standard, (v) denial of justice, (vi) discriminatory and arbitrary conduct, (vii) substantive violations of principles made relevant to the dispute
pursuant to a most favored nation (MFN) clause, and (viii) breach of compliance with obligations arising
from other investments, which may be made relevant to a dispute pursuant to an "umbrella clause."
42 It remains unclear in the "investor-state jurisprudence" whether a purely contractual claim may be
asserted within the rubric of a treaty-based arbitration. See, e.g., Karen Halverson Cross, Investment

Arbitration Panel Upholds Jurisdiction to Hear Mass Bondholder Claims againstArgentina,

INSIGHTS

(Am. Soc. of Int'l L., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 21, 2011, available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/
insightl II 121.pdf.
43 It has been meaningfully asserted that unlike WTO proceedings resulting in policy, rule, or legislative change on a prospective basis typically concerning tariffs, ISA is limited to microeconomic model
analysis. In furtherance of this proposition it is contended that because ISAs address a single specific
investment with relevant material timeframes pertaining to pre-entry and post-entry investment status, as
well as remedial measures limited to compensatory damages in connection with the investment at issue,
the economic scope of these arbitrations is micro only. See generally Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the
People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65
HAM L. REv. 2275 (1996-97).

FORD-

44 It is important to observe, however, that despite not being the norm, it is also not uncommon for
private arbitral institutions to process investor claims against a sovereign within a framework of private
international law rules that applies national and international law to substantive claims. Action based on
the breach of contractual obligations allegedly attaching to concession statements do form part of the
international arbitration firmament. In fact, it is not uncommon for such cases to entail choice of law
disputes. Specifically, it is common for the parties to dispute the extent to which public international law
takes precedence over the substantive law that the parties agreed to in the operative contract. See generally Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the InternationalArbitration of Individual
Claims againstthe State, 56 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 371 (2007) (discussing the "grey areas" in the public-

private distinction in the international arbitration).
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of the ad hoc nature of the short-lived tribunals 4 5 and judicially segregated status
of the process, these awards do not constitute binding precedent. 46 The arbitral
awards that ISAs generate are used as normative persuasive authority by tribunals, and quite frequently give rise to elaborate dissenting opinions. 4 7 The culture
of award writing is readily discernible and follows a structured configuration. 48
Notwithstanding the rather arresting differences and contrasts between ICA
and ISA, even under a surface analysis, it is apparent ISA has adopted ICA's
privacy-confidentiality features. This structural influence is quite remarkable because of the public international law configuration that so defines ISA. In these
proceedings public access and transparency are amply justified and even necessary in light of the very public nature of international investment law and the
public policy consequences that immediately redound to the investor-state claimant, and often, to the regulatory sphere of the host state. Despite the prominence
of these issues, however, privacy remains a point of contention from a structural
perspective in ISA.
E.

Grounds for Disclosure: Yet Another "Privacy Vestige"

Disclosure of facts that may lead to questions concerning an arbitrator's impartiality and independence is one issue that has garnered particular attention. 4 9
The standard governing arbitrator's duty to disclose set forth in the IBA Guide45 Of course, the term "short-lived" is relative. A number of ISAs, under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), recorded arbitrations lasting in excess of
five years. The expediency and efficiency components of international arbitration, both commercial and
investor-state are becoming museum-quality relics. The fact remains, nonetheless, that arbitrators serve
as such on an ad hoc matter-specific basis.
46 See Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 Fordham INr' i
L. J. 1014, 1016 (2006-07) ("[A]lthough arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration are not formally
bound by precedent in the same manner as common-law judges, there is an informal, but powerful,
system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to account for prior published awards and to stabilize
international investment law.").
47 Indeed, dissent writing in ISA has caused a robust dialogue among commentators, practitioners
and arbitrators. See, e.g., Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga & Harout Jack Samra, A Defense of Dissents in Investment Arbitration, 43 U. MIAMI. INEIR-AM. L. Rv. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author); Albert Jan
van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURIE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAi LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821-43 (M.
Arsanjani, J. Katz Cogan, R. Sloane, & S. Wiessner eds., 2010); Alan Redfem, The 2003 Freshfields
Lecture - Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 20 ARn. INT'l. 223, 224 (2004).
48 Considerable effort is expended in providing for a comprehensive factual and procedural narrative.
Also, the principal material arguments, claims, counterclaims, defenses and avoidances are appropriately
designated and "summarized." The tribunal's position on critical issues typically follows a narrative of
the opposing parties' respective positions. Despite the length of awards, often exceeding 200 pages, the
legal analysis generally is not as comprehensive or rigorous as with second instance appellate opinions
issued by U.S. appellate tribunals. As with their international commercial arbitration counterpart, ISA
awards also are synoptic.
49 See, e.g., Gabriel Bottini, Should ArbitratorsLive on Mars? ChallengeofArbitrators in Investment
Arbitration, 32 SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L. Riw. 341 (2008-09); Christopher Harris, Arbitrator Challenges
in InternationalInvestment Arbitration, 4 TRANSNAT'L Disi'. Mmr. 1 (2008) (noting that "[i]n international investment arbitration, the importance of the generally applicable twin qualifications demanded of
all arbitrators - independence and impartiality - is even greater than in international commercial
interest").
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lines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (the "IBA Guidelines").50 The IBA Guidelines adopt a subjective test that frames the inquiry of
impartiality from the vantage point of the parties and not the subject arbitrator's
personal subjective evaluation of whether particular facts indeed command disclosure: "Arbitrators shall disclose facts or circumstances which, in the eyes of
the parties may give rise to doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence, and '[a]ny doubt as to whether an arbitrator should disclose certain facts
or circumstances should be resolved in favour of disclosure.' "5'
The lingering issue concerning privacy and disclosure here addressed is to be
found in the "vestiges of privacy" that close scrutiny of the unchallenged arbitrator's opinions reflects in addressing challenges. The more helpful examples are
those where, as in SGS v. Pakistan, the unchallenged arbitrators correctly decided
the issue but regrettably failed to provide significant grounds in the opinion justifying their adjudication. 52 This want of analysis can best be understood as an
ICA privacy vestige that found repose and a sphere of influence in ISA.
In SGS v. Pakistan, the claimant challenged the decision on the ground that
counsel for respondent had presided over another tribunal that had issued an
award favorable to the respondent in Azinian v. United Mexican States.53 Moreover, one of the arbitrators in SGS had served as respondent's counsel of record in
Azinian as well. The proposition underlying claimant's argument was that the
challenged arbitrator would somehow encounter a moral imperative to reciprocate the favorable ruling that counsel in SGS v. Pakistan issued as a presiding
member of the tribunal.
In rejecting the challenge pursuant to Articles 57 and 14(1) of the ICSID Convention, the unchallenged arbitrators observed that "[t]he party challenging an
arbitrator must establish facts, of a kind or character as reasonably to give rise to
the inference that the person challenged clearly may not be relied upon to exercise independent judgment in the particular case where the challenge is made." 54
The core of the opinion's analysis serves as a paradigmatic example of a privacy
vestige:
It is commonplace knowledge that in the universe of international commercial arbitration, the community of active arbitrators and the community of active litigators are both small and that, not infrequently, the two
communities may overlap, sequentially if not simultaneously. It is widely
50 See IBA GuioELINvs ON CONFICTS o1 INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBrfRATION (International

Bar Association 2004), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publicationsIBA-guides-and.
freematerials.aspx#conflictsofinterest.
51 See Bottini, supra note 49, at 347 (citing the IBA Guidelines, Explanation to General Standard 3, 1
(a)-(b)).
52 SGS Socit6 Gendrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/13, Decision on Claimant's Proposal to Disqualify Arbitrator (Dec. 19, 2002), 8 ICSID Rep. 398
(2005) [hereinafter SGS v. Pakistan].
53 Id. at 398. See also Robert Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/97/2,
Award (Nov. 1, 1999).
54 See Bottini, supra note 49, at 351.
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accepted that such an overlap is not, by itself sufficient groundfor dis55
qualifying an arbitrator.

Neither juridical rigor nor propriety of the actual finding is of consequence for
purposes of this article. Rather, it is the quizzical opaque nature of so surface an
analysis that compels scrutiny. The tribunal's exegesis purports to find normative
foundation on an amorphous and somewhat banal principle divined out of whole
cloth. The very notion of "commonplace knowledge" is, at best, suspect. While
the intellectual history of epistemology indeed explored precepts and norms of
cognition, in part or in whole based on experience described as being common to
all persons, it is highly unlikely that the tribunal's reference attempted to seek
conceptual support from these writings. 56 The tribunal's recourse to "commonplace knowledge" undermines its own legitimacy and grounds the conclusion on
a hapless tour de force.

The reference to "the universe of ICA" is equally disconcerting. First, the proceeding sub judice was an investor-state dispute based upon the bilateral investment treaty ("BIT") executed between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and
Switzerland. Therefore, even within the tribunal's flawed conceptual categories,
the appropriate reference should have been to "the universe of ISA"-not ICA.
This observation aside, placing a serious construction on the tribunal's plain language, the cornerstone ruling is premised on little more than industry hearsay or,
less technically stated, industry gossip. A rigorous canvassing of authority construing Articles 57 and 14 of the ICSID Convention would have been warranted
worthy of an award that touches or concerns public policy and must satisfy public expectation beyond that of the parties. Reliance on the novel concept of "commonplace knowledge" pertaining to "the universe of international commercial
arbitration" bespeaks privacy in referring to a universe that cannot be discerned,
premised on an imputed knowledge base seemingly unworthy of an oral tradition,
let alone written source materials. Worse still, even assuming that both "commonplace knowledge" and the "universe of ICA" existed with sufficient rigor
and clarity from which cultural premises may be inferred and enshrined with the
status of legal norms, the tribunal's opinion does little more than state that the
status quo of industry practice is more than reason enough to avoid sustained
analysis.
55 See Bottini, supra note 49, at 351 (emphasis added).
56 In the Discourse on Method, Rene Descartes discusses common sense (le bon sen) somewhat
ironically in his famous first sentence "Le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagde" ("Good
sense is the most evenly distributed thing in the world"). RiNE DESCARTES, A DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD
5 (lan Maclean trans., 2006) (1637). IMMANUEL KANT, THi CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J.M.D.
Meiklejohn trans., 2010) (1781) (exploring whether an a priori synthetic judgment is possible) (emphasis
added). In so doing, Kant, to some extent universalizes some sort of "common knowledge" in a doctrinal
pronouncement, asserting that "[w]hile not all knowledge comes from experience, without experience
there can be no knowledge." Id. In a different but related vein, Blaise Pascal in his Pensdes fashions a
distinction between intuition and cognitive syllogistic knowledge. Id. Intuitive knowledge, according to
Pascal, appears to be a form of common knowledge or a common cognitive instrument pursuant to which
knowledge is attained without intermediary cognitive steps. Id. It does not appear, however, that the
tribunal had these theories in mind in fashioning a "common knowledge" arbitrator disclosure standard.
Id.
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F.

The "Privacy Vestige" in Award-Crafting

Privacy in award crafting, as a legacy from ICA, refers to a reluctance to
engage in a protracted juridical analysis upon which a conclusion is premised.
Such approach is particularly unwelcome in the case of ISA, where public standing is obvious and the arbitral jurisprudence is frequently used as persuasive authority and a doctrinal repository of juridical positions that in turn may enhance
the basic tenets upon which both ICA and ISA are premised: uniformity, predictability, transparency of standard, and party autonomy.
While it would be consonant with the formal mechanisms and structure of ICA
for awards to be abbreviated, in part because of the institutionally contemplated
limited merits review (accountability) for purposes of second instance recourse,
the same cannot be said of ISA where public policy and public issues are paramount. The exportation of ICA's culture of privacy explains the abbreviated legal
analyses and lack of juridical rigor as to the operation of public international law
doctrines in support of the tribunal's conclusion, despite the proliferation of
lengthy and often prolix awards engaging in factual narratives and recitations of
the parties' position on different points. 57
III. Investor-States' Quest for Transparency but not a Transparency
Norm
ICA's privacy vestige is evident in ISA's efforts to incorporate different forms
of transparency in addressing a gamut of issues including public access to proceedings,58 publication of awards, 59 standing of amicus petitions, 60 amicus participation 6 and public access to work-product. 6 2 ICSID faced the challenge of
having to meet justified public demands for access and transparency. Meeting
this demand was particularly arduous because of the low probability of amending
the Convention. Moreover, in adopting policy, ICSID must maintain a level playing field between capital-exporting countries and their capital-importing counterparts. The adoption of rules, policies, and regulations by ICSID must strike a
57 The award is often written in a language that is not the primary language of its authors. Moreover,
in the more successful proceedings, the award follows the model of a deliberation characterized as having
considerable verve from the active participation of all tribunal members. Yet, the formal quality of written work-product by committee itself has been questioned and has fostered the adage, "a horse by committee is a camel." In this limited formal regard, the committee work may prove to be a hindrance.
58 See, e.g., Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Decision of the Tribunal on Petition
from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae," (Jan. 15, 2001) 23 [hereinafter Methanex v. United
States] (explaining that the United States consented to the "open and public hearing of all hearings before
the Tribunal").
59 See, e.g., Id. 1 10 (explaining that Canada "supported public disclosure of arbitral submissions,
orders and awards to the fullest extent possible").
60 See, e.g., Id. IT 9-10 (explaining the differing approaches of Mexico and Canada with respect to
the standing of amicus petitions under NAFTA).
61 Id.

62 See, e.g., Id. 10 (explaining that Canada "supported public disclosure of arbitral submissions,
orders and awards to the fullest extent possible").
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balance that harmonizes the interests of prospective claimants 63 while safeguarding classical sovereignty concerns that host states-mostly developing nationshave expressed. 64
A.

The ICSID Perspective

The ICSID Secretariat's Working Paper dated May 12, 2005 expresses that
"[t]he Discussion Paper suggested changes concerned preliminary procedures,
publication of awards, access by third parties to the proceedings, and disclosure
requirements of arbitrators." 65 The underlying Discussion Paper on which the
May 12, 2005 Working Paper of the ICSID Secretariat is premised was sent to
the ICSID Administrative Council Business and Civil Society Groups from
whom the Secretariat of the Centre sought comments from "arbitration experts
and institutions around the world."66 Of the six arbitration rules published in the
Working Paper with suggested changes, four concerned transparency either in the
form of observation-monitoring, disclosure, publication-or submissions of
non-disputing parties. 67 These four suggested rule changes were materially
adopted and comport virtually verbatim with the current iteration of the corresponding rule.6 8
While the Working Paper described that reactions to the suggested changes as
"generally favorable," it did note that the "suggestions regarding access of third
parties in particular elicited some disagreement. Concerns were expressed that
any provisions on access of third parties to proceedings should subject such access to appropriate conditions ensuring, for example, that the third parties do not
by their participation unduly burden parties to the proceedings." 69 With one notable exception, none of the four transparency rules mention the words "confiden63 Claimants understandably express concern over the extent to which host-states may use national
law under the pretext to public health safety, or the environment to issue investment-impairing regulations or legislation.
64 Venezuela and Bolivia's recent departures from the Convention, Ecuador's officially expressed
intent to withdraw from the Convention, and Brazil's non-membership status, all highlight the delicate
procedural positioning and substantive import that any new policy, rule, or regulation that the center
adopts should meet. See, e.g., Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes
- Adoption, Adaption, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. Rtv. 1339, 1379-80 (2006) (addressing
this very issue and contextualizing it as part of a new generation of texts "consolidating, clarifying, and
promoting transparency practice").
65 ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules And Regulations (May 12, 2005)
(working paper), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServ-letrequestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=25_ 1.pdf
[hereinafter Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules].
66 Id. at 3.
67 Id. The suggested changes concerned ICSID Arbitration Rule: 39 (Preliminary Procedures), 41
(Preliminary Procedures), 48 (Publication of Awards), 32 (Access of Third Parties), 37 (Access of Third
Parties), and 6 (Disclosure Requirements for Arbitrators). Id. An additional suggested change was raised
concerning ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation 14. Id.
68 See Press Release, Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations (April 5, 2006), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Open-Page&Page
Type=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Achive_Announcement26.
69 See Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules, supra note 65, at 4.

Volume 10, Issue I

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

53

Juridical Convergence in International Dispute Resolution
tial" or "private" in any form. 70 Only in the declaration that members of the
constituted tribunal must execute does the word "confidential" appear with respect to knowledge secured from the proceedings or the contents of any award
made by the tribunal. This latter subject matter to which confidentiality on the
part of tribunal members attaches appears to enshrine the confidentiality attendant to the tribunal's deliberation process.
Instead of casting the amendments in the language of "privacy," "confidentiality," "transparency," or "public," the principle of party-autonomy, whether by
happenstance or design, pervades the framework. By way of example, ICSID
Rule 32(2) applies party-autonomy in the first subordinate clause: "unless either
party objects," 7 I but the word "public" is not referenced. Alternatively, the concept of public access is addressed with the language, "the Tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary General, may allow other persons, besides the parties,
their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses, and experts during their testimony. . .."72 Consequently, while greater public access, 7 3 participation,74 and
even clarity by dint of award publication subject to party agreement75 do indeed
provide for greater transparency generally, the 2006 Amendments do not import
a substantive principle of transparency gleaned from customary or conventional
international law. 76 The amendments do eloquently illustrate the propositions that
even within the rubric of transparency reforms (i) it is party-autonomy and not a
principle of transparency that is accorded conceptual prominence, (ii) despite legitimate public interest, the "non-disputing party rule" meaningfully qualifies

70 See Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules: Rules on
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, r. 6(2) [hereinafter ICSID Rules]. In part it states:
Before or at the first session of the Tribunal, each arbitrator shall sign a declaration in the following form: I shall keep confidential all information coming to my knowledge as a result of my
participation in this proceeding, as well as the contents of any award made by the Tribunal.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 See id. at r. 32(2) ("Unless either party objects, the Tribunal ... may allow other persons, besides
the parties . . . to attend or observe all or part of the hearings, subject to appropriate logistical arrangements. The Tribunal shall for such cases establish procedures for the protection of proprietary or privileged information.").
72 Id. (emphasis added).
73 Id.
74 See id. at r. 37(2)(a)-(c) (discussing the circumstances for allowing a non-party to file a writeen
submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute).
75 Id. at r. 48(4).
76 One of the difficulties inherent in the task of defining transparency in terms of a substantive norm,
or more generally identifying the principle in international law, arises from the many different, and
commonly disparate, applications and uses of the term.
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such participation, 7 7 and (iii) the revisions to the rules studiously omit structural
pronouncements as to the framework as "public," "private," or "confidential." 7 8
B.

Revisiting Methanex and the Case for a Transparency Norm

The non-disputing party rule, to a considerable extent, is the progeny of the
tribunal's decision on petitions from non-party amici curiae issued in 2001 in
Methanex Corp. v. United States of America79 and United Parcel Service of
America Inc. v. Government of Canada.8 0 Both cases-particularly Methanex be-

cause it addressed public policy and health and safety regulatory issues in the
context of environmental measures-gave rise to considerable literature.8 '
In seeking to make the case for the development of a substantive norm of
transparency to be incorporated into the very narrow field of international dispute
resolution evidence gathering, it will suffice to study the analytical bases upon
which Methanex was premised, which only once referenced transparency 82 and
ICSID Rules, supra note 70, r. 37(2). This rule reads:
After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a party to the
dispute (in this Rule called the "non-disputing party") to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow such a
filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which:
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a
factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties;
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the
dispute;
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding.
The Tribunal shall ensure that that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the
proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given
an opportunity to present their observations on the non-disputing party submission.
Id. (emphasis added).
78 See Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules, supra note 65, at 6-13. See also Press Release,
Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations (April 5, 2006), available at https://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSIDIFrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actioVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announcements
Frame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=ArchiveAnnouncement26.
79 Methanex v. United States, supra note 58.
80 United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae (Oct. 17, 2001) [hereinafter UPS v. Canada].
81 See, e.g., Kara Dougherty, Methanex v. United States: The Realignment of NAFTA Chapter II
with Environmental Regulation, 27 Nw. J. INT't L. & Bus. 735 (2007); Jessica C. Lawrence, Chicken
Little Revisited: NAFTA Regulatory Expropriations after Methanex, 41 GA. L. REV. 261 (2006-07);
Marisa Yee, The Future of Environmental Regulation after Article 1110 of NAFTA: A Look at the
Methanex and Metalclad Cases, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw J. ENvr'l L. & Pot'y 85 (2002-2003).
82 Methanex v. United States, supra note 58, 1 49.
There is an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration. The substantive issues extend far
beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between commercial parties. This is
not merely because one of the Disputing Parties is a State: there are of course disputes involving
States which are of no greater general public importance than a dispute between private persons.
The public interest in this arbitration arises from its subject matter, as powerfully suggested in
the Petitions. There is also a broader argument, as suggested by the Respondent and Canada: the
Chapter 11 arbitral process could benefit from being perceived as more open or transparent; or
conversely be harmed if seen as unduly secretive. In this regard, the Tribunal's willingness to
receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this arbitration in particular; whereas a blanket refusal could do positive harm.
Id.
77
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actually minimized scrutiny of substantive norms of international law in favor of
procedural rigor arising from textual language in applicable procedural rules. In
fact, the tribunal in Methanex,83 when faced with claimant's objection to the
amici curiae petitions on the theory that it would disavow the in camera application of Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 84 found that the extent
to which arbitration is confidential, the tribunal did not have to decide the
point.8 5 But for discussion on this very singular and circumscribed issue that it
did not decide and fleeting reference to a general benefit redounding to Chapter
II arbitral processes from "more open or transparent" proceedings,8 6 the decision
is brilliantly bereft of considerations of any substantive norms of international
law that either would define international arbitration as "private" or "confidential" or have any effect on such a proceeding. The tribunal in Methanex decided
that neither NAFTA 8 7 nor the UNCITRAL Rules proscribed amici curiae participation. Despite not explicitly referencing it, the tribunal availed itself of the principle of party-autonomy in fashioning its ruling. A review of the panel's
reasoning is instructive.
The public nature of the Methanex case arising from the safety, healthcare, and
environmental regulations underlying the operative claim commands a brief narrative in order to contextualize the Tribunal's analysis of the amici curiae petitions, which raised a classical public-access concern. Methanex's claim involved
the production and sale of a methanol-based source of octane and oxygenate for
gasoline that is known as methyl tertiary-butyl ether ("MTBE"). Specifically,
Methanex averred that MTBE was a safe, effective, and economical component
of gasoline and the oxygenate of choice in markets where free and fair trade is
allowed.88 Methanex also alleged that MTBE generated environmental benefits
and did not at all pose risk to human health or the environment.8 9 Central to
Methanex's position was the contention that firstly, no methanol production
plants were located in California and secondly, during the period 1993-2001 only
a fraction of the methanol directly consumed in California was produced anywhere in the United States (an average of 20.2 thousand metric tons out of a total
consumption figure of 185.5 thousand metric tons).9 0
The claims were brought under Article 116(1) NAFTA, based on breach by
the USA of two provisions in Section A of Chapter 11 of NAFTA: Article
83 The panel was initially constituted by William Rowley QC, Warren Christopher Esq, and V.V.
Veeder QC (Chairman), and later was reconfigured when Warren Christopher resigned and was substituted by Professor W. Michael Reisman. See Methanex v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), pt. II, ch. A, p. 5 [hereinafter Methanex Final Award].
84 The predecessor to the current Article 28(3) as revised in 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
85 Methanex v. United States, supra note 58, [ 46.
86 Id.

87 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
88 Methanex Final Award, supra note 83, at 1, pt. 11, ch. D.
89 Id.

90 Id. at 2. In the proceeding it was uncontested that methanol is the essential oxygenating element of
MTBE.
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1105(1) and Article 1110(1)-purportedly arising from losses caused by the
State of California's forthcoming ban on the sale and use of MTBE, which was
scheduled to become effective on Dec. 31, 2002.91
Viewed as a possible landmark case with far-reaching policy implications the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (the "Institute") was the first
of four NGOs to file a petition for amicus curiae status asserting an apology in
favor of a host-state's proper exercise of sovereignty through the enactment of
regulatory measures in furtherance of the public welfare touching on health,
safety, and environmental objectives, applied on a non-discriminatory basis. 9 2
The NGOs further advanced that under no analysis can such regulations be construed as violating international law and that they properly pertain to a hoststate's prerogative within its regulatory space. 93 Two additional precepts on
which the Institute predicated its petition were that the interpretation of Chapter
11 of NAFTA should reflect legal principles underlying the concept of sustainable development and "that participation of an amicus would allay public disquiet
as to the closed nature of arbitration proceedings under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA." 94
At the outset of its opinion the tribunal did not articulate any general pronouncement concerning the confidential or private nature of arbitration. No rebuttable presumption of this kind, whether embedded in the cultural practice of
international arbitration (commercial or investor-state) or discernible from international law, was stated. Instead, the tribunal opted for a very narrow construction of the issue without casting privacy or confidentiality as structural elements
of the entire arbitral framework.
In its crisp point of departure, the tribunal observed that "there is nothing in
either the UNCITRAL Rules or Chapter 11, Section B, that expressly confers
upon the tribunal the power to accept amicus submissions or expressly provides
that the tribunal shall have no such power." 95 In fact, the Tribunal distanced itself
from Methanex's argument that because former Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL
91 Methanex Final Award, supra note 83, at 1, pt. I, Preface. Methanex ultimately challenged three
legislative texts, (1) the 1999 California Executive Order certifying that "on balance, there is significant
risk to the environment from using MTBE in gasoline in California," (2) California Code of Regulations
Title 13, §§2273 requiring gasoline pumps containing MTBE to be labeled in California as follows:
"Contains MTBE. The State of California has determined that use of this chemical presents a significant
risk to the environment." §§2262.6 provided at sub-section (a)(1) that: "Starting December 31, 2002, no
person shall sell, offer for sale, supply or offer for supply in California gasoline which has been produced
with the use of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE)," and Amended California Regulations of May 2003,
expressly banning the use of methanol as an oxygenate in California. Id. at 7, pt. II, ch. D.
92 Petitions eventually were filed by (i) the International Institute for Sustainable Development, (ii)
Communities for a Better Environment, (iii) The Bluewater Network of Earth Island Institute, and (iv)
The Center for International Environmental Law. Methanex Final Award, supra note 83, at 15, pt. II, ch.
C.
93 See Methanex v. United States, Petitioner's Final Submission Regarding the Petition of the International Institute for Sustainable Development to the Arbitral Tribunal for Amicus Curiae Status (Oct.
16, 2000), ff 10-18. See also Methanex v. United States, supra note 58, 1 5 (The Institute's petition
sought leave "(i) to file an amicus brief (preferably after reading the parties' written pleadings), (ii) to
make oral submissions, (iii) to observe status at oral hearings.").
94 Methanex v. United States, supra note 58, 1 5.
95 Id. 1 24.
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Arbitration Rules (current Art. 28(3)) provides that hearings are to be held in
camera, confidentiality attaches to documents prepared in anticipation of hearings.96 Not having indulged in assumptions of privacy or confidentiality with
respect to international arbitration or in drawing inferences from the specific in
camera command in Article 28(3), the tribunal aptly sought normative foundation in the procedural principles vesting it with discretion found in former Article
15(1) (current Article 17) of the UNCITRAL Rules. 9 7 Article 15(1) ascribes to
the tribunal vast discretion in conducting the arbitration, subject to the controls
deriving from "procedural equality and fairness towards the Disputing Parties." 98
Having found recourse in a procedural principle, the tribunal was able to dispense with any petition that would have the effect of adding parties to the arbitration or engrafting substantive rights, status, or other privileges of a disputing
party upon non-parties. The tribunal explained that "receipt of written submissions from a person other than Disputing Parties is not equivalent to adding that
person as a party to the arbitration." 99 This distinction is particularly true, where,
as in that case, Methanex did not question the tribunal's authority to receive
amicus submissions, but rather asserted that the tribunal was to exercise its discretion by first determining that the papers at issue would contribute to the tribunal's adjudication while not burdening the parties with otherwise unforeseeable
submissions concerning a non-disputant party who cannot be cross-examined. 0 0
Four fundamental findings were reached material to the Tribunal's final order
holding that Article 15(1) allowed it to receive the written submissions petitioned.10 1 Its treatment of these predicate sub-issues to the inquiry-concerning
the extent to which former Article 15 vests a tribunal with discretion to accept
96 Id. 12. Methanex also asserted that the Sept. 7, 2000 Consent Order, the parties' had agreed that
transcripts, written submissions, witness statements, reports, etc., were to be kept confidential. Id.
97 See id. at 1 25-34 (describing the scope and application of UNCITRAL rule 15(1)).
98 Id. 126.
9 Id. 130.
100 Methanex raised four fundamental arguments. First, as to jurisdiction, it contended that the tribunal
lacked the jurisdiction to add a party to the proceedings absent agreement of the parties. On this point
Methanex asserted that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to engraft Chapter II NAFTA party status to
petitioners and that any such exercise of discretion would be beyond the scope of Article 15 of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Second, claimant maintained that public interest concerns were amply
protected by Article 1128 of NAFTA, which provided private interest groups with a methodology for
conveying their information to the NAFTA Parties, who in turn had standing to intervene if indeed there
was a NAFTA issue to be interpreted. In turn, the disputing parties had the ability to call petitioners as
witnesses. If petitioners were to appear as amici curiae, the disputing parties would be foreclosed from
cross-examination of the actual factual foundations underlying the operative submissions. Third,
Methanex, as did Mexico as a NAFTA party, advanced that it was "inappropriate" to engraft the practice
of the municipal courts that allowed for robust amici curiae participation onto international ISAs. While
the U.S and Canada embrace amicus briefs as a routine aspect of their respective domestic laws, Mexico
does not. Fourth and finally, claimant asked the tribunal to disregard WTO practice as irrelevant. It also
added that even if WTO practice were to be adopted as analytically helpful, the WTO precedent on the
issue revealed that the WTO Panel or Appellate Body Panel routinely ruled that such submissions were
not to be considered and that the power arising from Article XIII of the Dispute Settlement Understand14-5.
ing to seek data from non-party sources had not been applied to these issues. Id.
101 Specifically, four issues were framed and addressed:
(i) whether the Tribunal's acceptance of amicus submissions fall within the general scope of the
sub-paragraph numbered [2] of former Article 15(1);
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submissions from third-party non-disputants-was comprehensive and technical
but certainly did not reach out to international law in search of a substantive
transparency norm. Instead, the Tribunal (i) traced the contours of the Iran-U.S.
claims tribunal, the WTO, and ICJ practice in finding that it does not offend
international arbitration practice to receive submissions from third-party non-disputants;10 2 (ii) observed that any burden arising from petitioners' written submissions would be equally shared by both disputing parties and, therefore, cannot be
regarded as necessarily excessive for either disputing party; 0 3 (iii) considered
articles 1126(10), 1128, 1133, and 1137(4) of NAFTA and concluded that neither
these articles nor any provision in Chapter 11 of NAFTA directly addressed a
tribunal's authority to accept amicus submissions;104 and (iv) analyzed the scope
of former Article 25(4) (now Article 28(3)) of the UNCITRAL Rules finding that
the article is irrelevant as to receipt of submissions but pertinent to petitioners'
attendance at hearings and access to copies of materials provided to the tribunal. 0 5 It did not, however, seek recourse to international law for the proposition
that international arbitrations are endemically private or confidential or that receipt of the submissions was compelled as a matter of international law or public
policy. Further, despite a passing reference to the benefits of transparency, the
(ii) whether the acceptance of amicus submissions could affect the equal treatment of the Disputing Parties and the opportunity of each fully to present its case, under the sub-paragraph [3] of
former Article 15(1);
(iii) whether there are any provisions in Chapter 11, Section B of NAFTA that modify the application of Article 15(1) for present purposes; and
(iv) whether other provisions of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules likewise modify the application of a former Article 15(1) in regard to this particular case, given the introductory words of the
sub-paragraph [I] of former Article 15(l).
Id. 1 27-8.
102 Id. 11 32-4. In that connection, the tribunal emphasized that, the ICJ's practices reflect that "written submissions were received by the ICJ, unofficially, in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project, ICJ Reports, 1997." Id. 34. The Tribunal added:
The ICJ's practices provide little assistance to this case. Its jurisdiction in contentious cases is
limited solely to disputes between states; its Statute provides for intervention by States; and it
would be difficult in these circumstances to infer from its procedural powers a power to allow a
non-state third person to intervene.
Id.
103 Id. 36. The Tribunal added:
In theory, a difficulty could remain if a point was advanced by a Petitioner to which both Disputing Parties were opposed; but in practice, that risk appears small in this arbitration. In any case, it
is not a risk the size or nature of which should swallow the general principle permitting written
submissions from third persons.
Id. 37.
104 Id.
38-9. Specifically, it was observed that, "There is nothing relevant in these provisions for
present purposes. As the tribunal has already concluded, there is no provision in Chapter 11 that expressly prohibits acceptance of amicus submissions but likewise nothing that expressly encourages
them." Id. 39.
105 Id. 11 40-2. The Tribunal underscored that it is unsettled whether former Article 25(4) of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules impose a duty of confidentiality, and in so doing can vest authority from
the Swedish Supreme Court in Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, Ltd. v. A.I Trade Finance Inc.
(27.X.2000) suggesting that "a privacy rule in an arbitration agreement does not give rise under Swedish
law to a separate duty of confidentiality, at least as regards the award." It also underscored that the
approach was, "supported by the decision of the High Court of Australia in Esso/BHP v. Plowman (1993)
and 183 CLR 10, distinguishing between confidentiality and privacy, particularly as subsequently applied
by the New South Wales court in Commonwealth of Australia v. Cockatoo Dockyard Pty. Ltd. (1995) 36
N.S.W.L.R. 662." Id. 43.
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tribunal did not rely on a principle or norm of transparency as conceptual support
for its decision. 0 6
Methanex rightfully has been recognized for meaningfully contributing to a
transparent dispute resolution regime.10 7 This distinction is well justified. The
manifold richness of the opinion in addressing trilateral parties, deftly adjudicating the extent to which domestic regulations concerning public health, safety, and
the environment may affect international law protecting foreign investors, exploring the conceptual role of amici curiae, and finally, addressing the privacy/confidentiality dichotomy, is noteworthy. Adding to the Award's recognition, it was
the beneficiary of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission's ("FTC") July 31, 2001
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions addressing access to
documents, as well as considerable transparency related work that preceded it. 108
Precisely because the Methanex decision embodies multiple facets of transparency, namely: public access, non-party submissions, non-party participation,
non-party access to arbitral papers, and the incorporation of the FTC Interpretive
Note, the case is of considerable assistance in helping emphasize the privacy
vestige that ISA inherited from ICA. Additionally it exemplifies the structural
corrections that public international law must undertake in adjusting for private
international law contention legacies.
Both the 2006 Revisions to the ICSID Rules and the Methanex analysis contribute to the justification for the development of a substantive privative transparency norm that can be resorted to without any fundamental framework
modification to the workings of private and public international law dispute resolution. The development of such a privative transparency norm would serve as a
principle of convergence capable of bridging and harmonizing otherwise disparate juridical traditions. A transparency norm is particularly necessary in transnational evidence gathering and can provide for more vibrant participation,
disclosure, accountability, and expediency without the need to fashion rules of
1 49.
Howard L. Mann, The Final Decision in Methanex v. United States: Some New Wine in Some New
Bottles, INTL. INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE Div. (2005), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/
commentary-methanex.pdf.
108 The NAFTA Free Trade Commission's Interpretive Note read:
Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality under disputing parties to a
Chapter 11 Arbitration [or] precludes the Parties from providing public access to documents
submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter II tribunal.
106 Id.
107

Each Party agrees to make available to the public in a timely manner all documents submitted to,
or issued by, a Chapter II tribunal, subject to redaction of: (a) confidential business information;
(b) information which is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under the Party's
domestic law; and (c) information which the Party must withhold pursuant to the relevant Arbitral Rules, as applied.
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (July 31,
2001), available at http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/
nafta-interpr.aspx?lang=eng&view=d. Methanex contended that the FTC's Interpretive Note was an
amendment and not a viable interpretation of Article 1105, and, therefore, not binding of the tribunal
pursuant to Article 1131(2) NAFTA. The tribunal, in part, emphasized "Methanex cites no authority for
its argument that far-reaching changes in a treaty must be accomplished only by formal amendment
rather than by some form of agreement between all of the Parties." Methanex Final Award, supra note
83, at 10, pt. IV, ch. C.
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evidence gathering with substantive technical definitions that in turn would invite
objections based upon lack of universality. The general transparency principles
already adopted in international law documents would serve as necessary foundational conceptual premises.
IV. The Principle of Uncertainty in International Dispute Resolution and
the Need for a Unifying Transparency Norm
A.

Unsettled Structural Issues in Investor-State Arbitration

The privacy vestige is only one element of international dispute resolution
suggestive of a need for a privative transparency norm. ISA, and to a lesser extent, ICA, structurally and substantively suffer from a want of a uniform framework. This absence gives rise to a "principle of uncertainty." 0 9 Moreover,
critical aspects of ISA dispute resolution processes lack predictive value. ISA is
constituted by a fragmented system of approximately 3,000 bilateral investment
treaties that are not at all interconnected, conceptually organized, or containing
monolithic material clauses. 0 The universe of multilateral, regional, and bilateral investment treaties is completely devoid of structure, hierarchy, or of any
comparable organizing principle. I
At a less formal and more substantive level, rudimentary precepts of ISA remain materially unsettled. By way of example, perhaps the cornerstone standard
raised in ISA is the fair and equitable treatment standard ("FET") of protection
provided to foreign investors.' 12 Similarly, FET's relationship to the International
109 This principle of uncertainty primarily pervades ISA, as shall be discussed. The principle, however, finds considerable resonance in international commercial arbitration because of the vast discretion
accorded the arbitral tribunal, which is unprecedented in private international law. International commercial arbitration also presents uncertainties that concern structural features such as (i) the complete absence of an evidentiary framework that transfers this feature to virtually unbridled arbitral discretion, (ii)
indefinite as to the extent to which cross-examination would be allowed, (iii) evidence-gathering that is
too restrictive, (iv) equity-centric adjudication that displaces applicable substantive law, and (v) a general
adversity towards non-contractually based causes of action. These components of international commercial arbitration do violence to the core principles upon which international arbitration purports to be
founded and to further: party-autonomy, uniformity, transparency of standard, and predictability.
110 One commentator creatively has analogized the rubric as "a 'spaghetti bowl' of around 3,000
overlapping bilateral and regional treaties, tens of thousands of transnational contracts, and an unknown
number of domestic statutes whose purported aim is to stimulate economic development by attracting and
protecting foreign investments within the sovereign territories of individual host-states." Maupin, supra
note 23, at 2.
ill In this regard, international investment law stands in high relief with its international trade law
counterpart, which has been duly endowed with a framework and multi-institutional standing, such as the
WTO.
112 The fair and equitable treatment standard is perhaps the most malleable and, therefore, susceptible
even to unintentional over-use by claimants seeking to assert multiple claims arising from the same or
overlapping infractions. Commentators have criticized the standard as conducive to abuse by claimants
seeking to engraft it on violations, which, according to these writings, are substantively distinct from the
fair and equitable treatment claim. Olivia Chung, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime
and Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. IN'L L. 953, 961 (2006-07) (citing
Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT L,L. 301, 306 (2004)) ("Fair and equitable treatment clauses . . . have become 'black holes of investment treaties' that invite a flood of litigation not
originally contemplated by developing countries.").
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Minimum Standard ("IMS") has also galvanized a number of competing theories
of practical consequences to international dispute resolution. 13 IS IMS the same
or different from FET? If substantively different, what is the difference? May the
difference have any effect on damages quantum?

Whether an umbrella clausel 14 in an ISA shall be allowed to incorporate nontreaty based claims into the proceeding remains equally ill defined. The seminal
cases on whether an umbrella clause indeed automatically accords treaty status to
contractual claims remain hopelessly unsettled.' 15
See, e.g., IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL
oF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2011). The author cogently asserts that FET is separate and distinct from
IMS and points, inter alia, to the aberrant development of the standard as being one that first was codified and only subsequently forming part of customary international law in contrast with the converse
conceptual development pursuant to which customary international law principles are later codified, as
part of the grounds that give rise to this confusion. Kliiger in turn observes:
It might well be that in some circumstances in which the international minimum standard is
sufficiently elaborate and clear, the standard of fair and equitable treatment might be equated
with it. But in other cases, it might as well be the opposite, so that the fair and equitable treatment standard will be more precise than its customary international law forefathers.
ROLAND KLAGER, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREArMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 81 (2011).
Here Kliger suggests that the evolutionary development of the standard is one from customary international law to conventional international law. In material contrast to Tudor, Kliger further states:
On many occasions, the issue will not even be whether the fair and equitable treatment standard
is different or more demanding than the customary standard, but only whether it is more specific,
less generic and spelled out in a contemporary fashion so that its application is more appropriate
to the case under consideration. This does not exclude the possibility that the fair and equitable
treatment standard imposed under a treaty can also eventually require a treatment additional to or
beyond that of customary law. Such does not appear to be the case with the present dispute,
however. The very fact that recent interpretations of investment treaties have purported to change
the meaning or extent of the standard only confirms that, those instruments aside, the standard is
or might be a broader one.
Id.
114 An umbrella clause is a provision present in many bilateral investment treaties that imposes
a
requirement on each contracting state to observe typically all investment obligations entered into with
investors from the other contracting state. See Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment
Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed
Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 137 (2006). The umbrella clause, for
example, in the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between United States and Romania, signed on May 28,
1992, in Article Il(2)(C) states that "[e]ach [p]arty shall observe any obligation it may have entered into
with regard to investments." Id. The BIT between the Netherlands and the Republic of Paraguay in
Article 111(4) is slightly more elaborate: "Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have
entered into with regard to investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party." Id. Finally, by way
of illustration, the BIT between the Republic of Korea and Libya in Article X(3) adds the element of
113

LAW

territoriality to the BIT: "Each Contracting Party shall observe any other obligation it may have entered
into with regard to investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting Party." Id.
115 Quite remarkably, the cases addressing this issue all have the same claimant. See SGS Socidt6
Gendrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on
Claimant's Proposal to Disqualify Arbitrator (Dec. 19, 2002), 8 ICSID Rep. 398 (2005); SGS Socit6
Gendrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005). The tribunal in SGS v.
Pakistandeemed the adoption of claimant's interpretation of the umbrella clause in Article 11 of the BIT
between Switzerland and Pakistan so far-reaching in scope, and so automatic and unqualified and sweeping in their operation, and so burdensome in their potential impact upon a Contracting Party that clear
and convincing evidence must be adduced by the claimant that such was indeed the clear intent of the
Contracting Parties. SGS v. Pakistan, 8 ICSID Rep. 518, 167. Accordingly, SGS v. Pakistan stems
from the proposition that there is a strong presumption that umbrella clauses do not apply to obligations
arising under investor-state contracts. In stark contrast, in SGS v. Philippines, the tribunal decided that
the umbrella clause applies to all breaches of the relevant investor-state contract but ultimately declined
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Fundamental inquiries concerning the scope and application of a Most Favored Nation ("MFN") clause remain unsettled, if not altogether opaque."1 6 It is
unclear whether an MFN clause only applies to substantive and not procedural
terms of a treaty.' "7 Additional uncertainty arise as to the extent to which claimants abuse their rights when seeking to secure recovery from a State's exercise of
sovereignty in furtherance of public health and welfare pursuant to environmental
decrees, or whether in the name of "public purpose" a sovereign's exercise of its
regulatory authority is exempt from international investment law.' 18 ISAs borrow
considerable normative precepts for final awards from other similarly situated ad
hoc tribunals whose awards lack binding authority as precedent.' 19
The uncertainty principle in arbitration arises from the absence of predictive
value that is endemic to procedural structural elements and substantive doctrines
configuring ISA. This uncertainty principle, coupled with the privacy vestige,
make the most persuasive and compelling case for the propriety of a transparency
norm that is substantive in nature and more than just a general rule prescribing
disclosure, monitoring, or access. Identifying elements of a substantive transparency norm in treaties, international law documents, and other sources authority, is a condition precedent to the application of such a norm to discreet aspects
of international dispute resolution, such as evidence gathering, if in fact international dispute resolution is to redeem its promise to harmonize disparate juridical
cultures and systems.
V.

A Substantive Transparency Norm and Evidence Gathering

A.

In Search of a Principle of Transparency in International Law

The foundational work necessary for the development of an overarching substantive principle of transparency in international law begins first as a search for
principles. As a very general concept, transparency has garnered the attention of
to exercise jurisdiction because the underlying contract contained an exclusive forum selection clause
that designated a different forum for the resolution of contractual disputes. SGS v. Philippines,8 ICSID
Rep. 518, 1[155. As to this finding, Professor Gaillard commented:
[T]o the extent this solution recognises 'in principle' an investor's right to choose an international arbitral tribunal for the settlement of its investment disputes, and, in the same breath,
requires that the selected tribunals stay the proceedings on the basis of an exclusive forum selection clause contained in the investment contract, it results in the BIT tribunal having jurisdiction
over an empty shell and depriving the BIT dispute resolution process of any meaning.
Emmanuel Gaillard, International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases From The ICSID,
NAFTA, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Customary International Law 325, 334 (2005).
116 Most-favored nation clauses "oblige the State granting MFN treatment to extend to the beneficiary
State the treatment accorded to third States in case this treatment is more favorable than the treatment
under the treaty between the granting State and the beneficiary State." Stephan W. Schill, Mulitilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation Clauses, 27 BERKIzY J. INT'L L. 496, 502
(2009).
117 Id. at 528-48.
11 Chung, supra note 112, at 963.

119 Even the extent to which dissenting opinions should issue is being aggressively contested in contemporary commentaries. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 112 (discussing multiple facets of the function of
precedent); see also Martinez-Fraga & Samra, supra note 47 (advocating for the inclusion of published
dissents in arbitration proceedings).
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commentators who have appreciated the need to communicate or render public
structural features of international dispute resolution.120 More expansively, the
term transparency has been identified as relevant to the development of international economic law,121 a fundamental principle of corporate governance applicable to multinational corporations,1 2 2 a central precept defining citizens' right to
government information,1 23 and an organizing principle in the relations between
institutions and regimes of international law and member States. 124 Transparency
as an undefined principle has found a voice and stature as a criteria by which to
measure the legitimacy of purported democratic political processes 25 and even
as an essential element of human rights.1 26
Despite the thoughtful proliferation of writings surrounding the term in virtually every major aspect of international law, transparency as a principle of international law remains elusive.127 The evasive nature of transparency is
fundamentally connected to the word's own extraordinary aspiration of presenting what is actual and free from attributes that may detract from or alter that
which is true. Thus, it is intimately connected at a fundamental conceptual level
with the Attic Greek term for truth, "aletheia,"l28 which in turn is derived from
the verb "lanthanum,"l 29 and connected with the noun, "leithei."l 30
120 See, e.g., Fracassi, supra note 19 (discussing confidentiality in NAFTA-related arbitration); McGraw & Amerasinghe, supra note 20 (discussing transparency in investor-state arbitration); Rogers,
supra note 21 (discussing transparency in commercial arbitration).
121 Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Transparency:An Analysis of an Evolving FundamentalPrinciple of InternationalEconomic Law, 27 MICH. J. lar'L' L. 579, 580-81 (Winter 2006).
122 Rogers, supra note 21, at 1325, n.103 (citing Larry Catd Backer, Multinational Corporations,
TransnationalLaw: The United Nations' Norms on the Responsibilitiesof TransnationalCorporationsas
a Harbingerof CorporateSocial Responsibility in International Law, 37 Coitum. Hum. Ris. L. REv.
287, 304 (2006)).
123 Marcel Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Case 12.108, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 60/03, OEA/Ser.U
VI. 118, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003).
124 Zoellner, supra note 121, at 581; William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International
Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 227, 250-51 (1997); Kenneth Abbott, "Trust but
Verify": The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements,
26 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1, 40-5 (1993).

125 See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State, 87 FoREIGN At+. 36, 45-6 (2008) ("Poorly performing democracies need better, stronger, and more democratic
institutions-political parties, parliaments, and local governments-linking citizens to one another and to
the political process. . . . Reform requires the internal democratization of political parties through the
improvement of their transparency and accessibility and the strengthening of other representative
bodies.").
126 See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Ill YALE L. J. 1935,
1957-58 (2002) (underscoring the importance of transparency to compliance with international human
rights treaties and the efficacy of international law).
127 See, e.g., Kristin Lord, War and Peace in an Age of Transparency,4 GEo. J. INr'L Ai-. 130 (2003)
(regarding international security); Steve Charnovitz, Transparencyand Participationin the World Trade
Organization,56 RUTGERS L. REv. 927 (2003-2004) (regarding international trade law); Timothy J. McCormally, Responding to the New Age of Transparency, 14 INr'L TAX RiEv. 3 (2003) (regarding international taxation).
128 AN IrBnRMEDIATE GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 34 (H. G. Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart
Jones eds., Oxford 9th ed. 1945) (1889).
129 Id. at 464-65.
130 Id. at 470-71.
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The verb lanthanum is etymologically connected to the noun leithei. Despite
the wide range of meanings that can be legitimately ascribed to the verb lanthanum, all appear to single out one very common concept of "escaping notice", and
therefore, "of being forgotten", or even "of causing something to be forgotten." 1 3' The noun leithei means "forgetting" or "forgetfulness".1 3 2 The Attic
Greek word for truth, aletheia, curiously has a privative etymological root meaning, i.e., "the absence of forgetfulness."I 3 3 The meaning of aletheia expands to
include-primarily the sense of the true as opposed to the false-the real in contrast to the apparent and the unconcealed as opposed to the hidden.1 3 4 Contrary to
the modern use of the English word "truth", the word "aletheia" is used of things
as well as of statements of the unconcealed as opposed to the obscured, of the
honest in contrast to the deceptive, and of the true statement as opposed to the
false one.' 3 5 For present purposes, it is important to observe that the Attic Greek
language for truth, aletheia, is not presented positively. Instead, aletheia presents
the truth conceptually in the negative, as the absence of concealment.
The use of transparency in international law also is presented negatively, much
like aletheia, in the sense of access or disclosure requiring affirmative undertaking on the part of the object. These uses of transparency are susceptible to being
categorized rather comprehensively into nine sets: (1) openness/access to spectators,' 36 (2) openness/access to source materials,' 3 7 (3) openness/access to monitor,' 3 8 (4) openness/access to full participation, 139 (5) disclosure manifested in an
affirmative production of information,140 (6) openness/access to submit,'41 (7)
procedural openness facilitating process legitimacy,14 2 (8) political accountability,14 3 and (9) openness/access to corroborate parity and/or reciprocity
compliance.144
131 Id. at 464-65.

132 Id. at 470-71. The River "Lethe", in Greek mythology, the "River of Forgetfulness" is referenced
in Book X in Plato's The Republic, where presumably the reincarnated souls have to cross the "plain of
Lethe" and drink from the river before being born again so that all memory of their past life may be
erased. PLATO, THE REPuBic 277 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968) (c. 380 BC).
133 AN INTERMEDIATE GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON, supra note 128, at 34.
134 Id.
135 Id.

136 See, e.g., Methanex v. United States, supra note 58, 23 (explaining that the United States consented to the "open and public hearing of all hearings before the Tribunal.").
137 See id. 10 (explaining that Canada "supported public disclosure of arbitral submissions, orders
and awards to the fullest extent possible.").
138 See id. 23 (explaining that the United States consented to the "open and public hearing of all
hearings before the Tribunal.").
139 Id.

140 See id. 10 (explaining that Canada "supported public disclosure of arbitral submissions, orders
and awards to the fullest extent possible.").
141 See id. H 9-10 (explaining the differing approaches of Mexico and Canada with respect to the
standing of amicus petitions under NAFTA).
142 Id.
143 Id.

144 Id. [[ 10, 23.
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Because of the multiple structural needs for some form or permutation of
transparency requiring a corresponding act of "unconcealing" as to access or
publication, the term lingers on without conceptual development. The multifarious environment in which transparency in some form finds space in international
law comports with the nine above-referenced classifications.
B.

Transparency in Select Sources of International Law

An emblematic treaty that embodies the post-Westphalian sovereignty model
of interdependence-in contrast with independence-of nations is the Energy
Charter Treaty (the "ECT").14 5 The ECT explicitly references transparency in
connection with the substantive international investment law principles of FET,
non-discriminatory practice, and IMS.1 4 6 The ECT mentions transparency together with "stable, equitable, and favorable" as adjectives for the conditions that
investors are to enjoy in each of the contracting States, which in turn would
include the core of international investment law standards that host-states are
committed to provide to foreign investors: FET, FPS, 147 protection from unreasonable or discriminatory measures, and IMS.
The application of transparency to the broad gamut of conditions attendant to
investments implicitly suggests that the form of transparency that the ECT contemplates as a predicate to application of the substantive standards of investment
protection to foreign investors, must itself be privative, i.e., incorporating all nine
categories of transparency identified herein.14 8 This view of transparency within
the meaning of Article 10(1) of the ECT not only comports with the variety and
manifoldness of investment conditions giving rise to FET and IMS, but also with
the very nature of a treaty-the enforcement of which generally necessitates political and procedural transparency.
Although the term "transparency" does not appear in any form in Chapter 18
of the NAFTA, virtually all elements of what here has been identified as "privative transparency" are present. The NAFTA parties are charged with rigorous
publication requirements concerning its laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings as well as other matters that may be of interest to citizens of
the NAFTA signatories.14 9 Also, proposed measures and access for participation
145 Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995) [hereinafter ECT].

Id. at art. 10(1). This article explains:
Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and
create stable, equitable, favorable and transparentconditions for investors of other Contracting
Parties to make Investments in its area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at
all times, to Investments, of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment.
Such Investments also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party
shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, or disposal. In no case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less
favorable than that required by international law, including treaty obligations.
Id. (emphasis added).
147 Instead of Full Protection and Security, the ECT mentions "constant protection and security." Id. at
art. 10(1).
148 Supra Part V.A.
149 See NAFTA, supra note 87, art. 1802(1).
146
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is additionally memorialized in this chapter.15 0 Actual participation in proceedings extended to non-NAFTA parties, along with "procedural transparency" are
addressed.' 5 1 The absence of explicit reference to transparency in the NAFTA
Chapter 18 does not diminish the compelling statement that central elements of a
privative transparency norm pervade administrative and institutional provisions.
An explicit reference to transparency is not necessary because of the Preamble's
declaration concerning the establishment of "clear and mutually advantageous
rules governing [the trade of the NAFTA parties] [and to] ensure a predictable
commercial framework for planning and investment." 5 2
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD")
comments on the gradual but "significant qualitative progress" that the principle
of transparency has forged in bilateral investment treaties.1 53 UNCTAD's summary on this specific issue merits reading and re-reading in its entirety:
A minority of BITs include transparency provisions. However, gradual,
yet significant qualitative progress has been made with regard to the rationale and content of such rules. While there has been a trend towards
viewing transparency as an obligation imposed on countries to exchange
information, new approaches also deem it to constitute a reciprocal obligation involving host-countries and foreign investors. Transparency obligations are also no longer exclusively geared towards fostering exchange
of information; rather they relate to transparency in the process of domestic rule-making aimed at enabling interested investors and other stakeholders to participate in that process.1 54
UNCTAD's observations attest to the development and ascendancy not only
of the narrow issue of transparency in BITs, but more importantly the multiple
spheres of the transparency principle referenced-if not systematically defined
and adopted-by international law. Reference is also made to transparency as a
principle that encompasses not only reciprocal disclosure obligations, but one
that also occupies the space of domestic rule-making and the realm of process
participation legitimacy.' 55
150 See id. art. 1802(2).
151 Id. art. 1804(a) & (b). This article reiterates that:
(a) wherever possible, persons of another Party that are directly affected by a proceeding are
provided reasonable notice, in accordance with domestic procedures, when a proceeding is initiated, including a description of the nature of the proceeding, a statement of the legal authority
under which the proceeding is initiated and a general description of any issues in controversy:
(b) such persons are afforded a reasonable opportunity to present facts and arguments in support
of their positions prior to any final administrative action, when time, the nature of the proceeding
and the public interest permit . . . .
Id.
152 See NAFTA, supra note 87, pmbl.
153 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), Bilateral Investment Treaties 19952006: Trends in Investment Rule-Making, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5 (2007).
154 Id. at (xiii) (emphasis added).
155 UNCTAD observes that
[m]ost other approaches used in its BITs however, do not focus on transparency concerning
investment opportunities, but rather on laws, regulations and administrative practices applicable
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Beyond the parameters of international investment law, transparency in general terms has been identified as a necessary principle. The United Nations has
called for transparency on a wide range of issues from measures to be implemented in controlling and bringing an end to "illicit traffic in small arms and
light weapons"l 56 to "development and poverty eradication." 5 7 The United Nations reiterated the primacy of transparency as embodied in its Millennium Declaration in the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development.15 8 As part of
an effort to fashion a global response to challenges confronting financing for
development, the final text of agreements and commitments adopted at the International Conference on Financing for Development declares:
Recognizing that peace and development are mutually reinforcing, we are
determined to pursue our shared vision for a better future, through our
individual efforts combined, with vigorous multilateral action. Upholding
the Charter of the United Nations and building upon the values of the
Millennium Declaration, we commit ourselves to promoting national and
global economic systems based on the principles of justice, equity, democracy, participation, transparency, accountability, and inclusion. 159
More specifically, the United Nations text on the Monterrey Consensus identified a need for a transparency principle in sectors such as the mobilization of
public resources and the management of their use by governments, 160 the enhancement of domestic markets pursuant to the development of sound banking
systems, 16 1 and foreign direct investments into developing countries. 1 6 2 In this
to foreign investment in the host country. Transparency is conceived as a tool to foster a more
predictable investment climate, in which investors can clearly assess the conditions and rules
applying to their investments.
Id. at 77. It is also reported that certain BITs, such as the 2004 Canadian model BIT expands transparency with respect to investment-related rule-making to apply "not only to existing legislation, but
also to draft laws and regulations." Id. at 78. Finally, the UNCTAD Report explains that "[t]he emphasis
of some BITs on using transparency provisions to strengthen the concept of due process of law is underlined by some supplementary obligations included in other agreements," citing to the BIT between the
United States and Uruguay (2005). Id.
156 United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18,
2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.
157 Id. at 4 ("Success in meeting these objectives depends, inter alia, on good governance within each
country. It also depends on good governance at the international level and on transparencyin the financial, monetary, and trading systems. We're committed to an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable, and
non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial system.") (emphasis added) Id.
158 International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, Mar. 18-22, 2002,
Monterrey Consensus on Financingfor Development, 1 9, 25, 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 198/11 (Oct.
2003).
159 Id. 1 9.
160 Id. 15.
161 Id. 17.
162

Id. 21
To attract and enhance in-flows of productive capital, countries need to continue their efforts to
achieve a transparent, stable and predictable investment climate, with proper contract enforcement and respect for property rights, embedded in sound macroeconomic policies and institutions that allow businesses, both domestic and international, to operate efficiently and profitably
and with maximum development impact . ...

Id.
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same vein, the United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary-General
connects the rule of law with procedural and legal transparency.16 3
C. The Application of the Transparency Norm to International Evidence
Gathering
After reviewing select international law instruments, a general principle of
transparency can be readily discerned. Much like the conceptual etymology of
the term aletheia, the principle as it appears suggests, if not altogether commands, an affirmative undertaking as its privative pronouncement calls for a universal absence of concealment. However, if a transparency principle is to develop
and maximize its contribution to international law, it must be vested with particularity as to standard which it sets forth. Based on the multiple uses of transparency in international law, this particularity should comprise two parts, the first
of which consists of nine elements.
The first conceptual category with which a privative transparency norm must
be vested is an affirmative imperative of access and disclosure. The nine elements of this category have been gleaned from universally accepted sources of
international law, and, as already referenced,' 64 consist of the following:
(i) Openness/access as to spectators,
(ii) Openness/access as to source materials,
(iii) Openness/access to monitor,
(iv) Openness/access to full participation,
(v) Disclosure as in an affirmative production of information,
(vi) Openness/access to submit,
(vii) Procedural openness leading to process legitimacy,
(viii) Political accountability, and
(ix) Openness/access to corroborate parity and/or reciprocity compliance.
The second category constituting the transparency norm is affirmative reciprocity/parity.
The theory underlying this first-step, embryonic framework is to provide a
standard by which the transparency norm may find universal acceptance at a
theoretical level, while preserving a practical aptitude. A non-value vested standard would be most conducive to juridical cultural convergence. By way of example, it would additionally provide transnational procedural rules concerning
163 See The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 16, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/
616 (Aug. 23, 2004)
The 'rule of law' is a concept at the very heart of the Organization's mission. It refers to a
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, even
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of
law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law,
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness
and procedural and legal transparency.
(emphasis added) Id.
164 Supra Part V. A.
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evidence gathering greater uniformity in their application, simultaneously introducing substantive content to critical terms.
The IBA Rules serve as an instructive functional model. 16 5 Perhaps the most
important standard that the IBA Rules articulate is the "relevant to the case and
material to its outcome" pronouncement.' 6 6 That standard appears throughout the
architecture of the Rules as a recurring criterion.167 The strategic and uniform use
of the standard at the consultation, self-disclosure, and disclosure procedural
junctures emphasizes its primacy. Yet, the standard, which is deemed to represent
a synthesis fundamental to common and civil law concerns, 6 8 nowhere defines
the terms "relevant" or "material".
Similarly, the terms "evidence" and "expert" are not defined. While the term
"expert report" is defined as "a written statement by a Tribunal-appointed Expert
or a Party-appointed Expert," within the terms of the IBA Rules,169 there is no
significant predicate from which to infer the significance of the term "expert"
within the IBA Rules' own regime. The qualification of a witness as an expert is
thus relegated to the arbitral tribunal's discretion.
Parallel in importance to the "relevant to the case and material to the outcome"
standard is the introduction of a good faith requirement, which is new to the 2010
iteration of the IBA Rules.170 As with the terms "relevance," "material," and
"expert witness," "good faith" is not defined.
Whether by happenstance or design, the absence of substantive definitionseither conceptual or by way of a standard-emphasizes the challenges that legitimate and actual juridical cultural convergence faces. Terms such as good faith or
relevance vary greatly depending on the legal framework housing them. While
not necessarily unachievable, arriving at substantive definitions or standards for
these terms on a cross-cultural basis would be very difficult and finds little favor.
A more achievable aspiration would be a transparency norm that helps flesh
out the parameters of applicability in relation to concepts such as materiality and
relevance. The categorical standards that comprise the privative transparency
norm that this writing proposes as a preliminary effort would allow a tribunal to
test access and disclosure requirements. Similarly, considerations of reciprocity
and parity may facilitate good faith analyses. It would redound to the best interest
165 It is not within the scope of this writing to comment extensively, let alone exhaustively on the IBA
Rules. Instead, the objective is to highlight structural aspects of the Rules, merely as a model, where a
transparency norm as here preliminarily defined may give rise to more comprehensive and universal
application of the rules. It is not here asserted that the privative transparency norm conceptually should
be limited to evidence gathering. Transnational evidence gathering, however, happens to combine a privacy vestige with an evidence gathering system that multiplies lack of juridical cultural convergence.
166 First encountered in IBA 2010 RULES, supra note 11, art. 2, 3(a) ("The Arbitral Tribunal is
encouraged to identify to the Parties, as soon as it considers it to be appropriate, any issue: (a) that the
Arbitral Tribunal may regard as relevant to the case and material to its outcome ....) (emphasis added).

167 IBA 2010 Ruus, supra note I1, art. 3, 3(a)-(b), art. 3, l 1, art. 4,

19; art. 8, 5, art. 2, 3(a).

168 Id. at pmbl.,
1.
169 Id. 5 (defining "expert report").

170 The term "good faith" appears only twice in the IBA Rules - in the Preamble and again in the final
paragraph - the symmetry in the placement of the term on these two occasions is important and suggestive. Id. at pmbl., T 1, art. 9, 7.
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of the international law community to fashion a privative transparency norm
commanding affirmative undertakings which, in effect, arises from customary
and conventional usage of transparency in international law. While the ad hoc
use of the word devoid of any single particular meaning has served international
law well, the benefits deriving from the multifarious application of the general
term compel conceptualization in the form of a single norm.
VI.

Conclusion

In light of economic and informational globalization, the demand for legal
convergence among disparate juridical traditions has never been greater. Unlike
its international trade law counterpart, international investment law, and more
particularly the law of international dispute resolution, are yet to develop so as to
keep pace with the needs of economic and informational globalization. Consequently, ICA and ISA remain as "weigh stations" until such time as transnational
judicial tribunals may exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising in both private
and public international contexts.
Perhaps the most pronounced chasm dividing common and civil law juridical
cultures is to be found in the difference between evidence gathering and American-style discovery. Although meaningful efforts, such as the IBA Rules, seeking
to accommodate both traditions represent material gains in the field, the divide
lingers and continues to be polarizing. One approach in an attempt to harmonize
competing conceptions is to incorporate a norm premised on transparency that in
turn may help to reconcile these differences. A transparency-based norm appears
to be particularly appropriate because of the privacy/confidentiality structural
configuration of ICA, engrafted as a developmental legacy onto investor-state
arbitration. The structural and substantive uncertainties endemic to both ICA and
ISA also create a space for this norm. Moreover, numerous sources of international law concerning diverse fields-ranging from human rights to international
investment protection-have adopted some form the concept of transparency, but
have never elevated it to the stature of a norm or principle of international law.
The privative transparency norm outlined purports to represent a first-step towards this effort by comprising two conceptual categories, both arising from the
general ad hoc use of transparency as the term appears in international law
sources. Arbitrators, judges, practitioners, and captains of industry would be able
to accord greater uniformity and predictive value to international frameworks,
such as those of the IBA Rules, that otherwise would leave undefined and untested central premises of practical consequences.
Ironically, the significance of the word "transparency" in international law is
less than clear. Yet, its very ubiquitous nature compels its ascendance to theoretical normative standing in order to maximize transparency's uniform and practical
application.
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